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NFIB V. SEBELIUS AT 5
NICOLE HUBERFELD*
BOSTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
Keeping up with health care reform is like running up a mountain of
sand - every time you reach the top, -the terrain starts shifting. In this talk, I
offer a snapshot of where we are in implementing the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act ("ACA") to aid in understanding the significance of
NFIB v. Sebelius' at five. I will situate the ACA2 within historical patterns
in American health care reform. I have been asked to discuss the key points
of the NFIB decision, after which I will share some of the research that I have
performed for the past five years with co-authors to understand health care
federalism within the context of implementing the ACA.3 Finally, I will talk
a bit about where health care reform may be going from here and how NFIB
has ongoing impact on implementing the ACA, even into a new presidential
administration.
We have been attempting to figure out health care in the United
States for more than one hundred years.4 Despite political rhetoric indicating
the ACA is a uniquely nationalistic intrusion into historically state-based
health care, a pattern exists to our efforts at health care reform, and it is more
than the fact that every president who attempted to create national health care
- starting with Theodore Roosevelt - has been unsuccessful. More
importantly, when the federal government has acted, it is because states and
markets generally have failed. In addition, Congress tends to legislate health
care incrementally, even when responding to patterns of marked state or
market failure, and even when a completely national program might be more
constitutionally straightforward.
* Professor of Health Law, Ethics & Human Rights, Boston University School of Public Health
and Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. Thanks to the University of St. Thomas
School of Law for hosting the March 2017 symposium "NFIB v. Sebelius at 5: The Affordable
Care Act and the Role of the Federal Government in Healthcare Reform," from which this
transcript was produced, and to the editors of the University of St. Thomas Journal of Law &
Public Policy for their work. Thanks always DT and SRHT.
I Nat'lFed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
2 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. §18001 (2010); see also Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (amending key
provisions of the ACA).
3 See Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What Is Federalism in Health Care For?, 70 STAN. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3128270; see also
Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, The New Health Care Federalism on the Ground, 15 IND.
HEALTH L. REv. 1 (2018) (discussing interviews with stakeholders in ACA implementation).
4 A historical look at health care legislation, BOSTON.COM, Mar. 21, 2010,
http://archive.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2010/03/21/a-historical-look-at-healt
h-care_1egislation/?page=full.
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For example, FDR attempted to write national health care into the
Social Security Act in the 1930s, because the Great Depression revealed that
states could not afford to provide medical welfare. When Harry Truman
attempted to create a national health care program after World War II, it was
because the states could not afford to care for the impoverished and for the
soldiers returning from the war who needed serious medical attention. In the
1950s, the federal government offered medical vendor payments to the states
to help with medical costs because the states could not afford to care for their
impoverished and aging populations.' Likewise, when Lyndon Johnson
ushered the passage of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965, it was in response to
prior failed attempts to cover health care for the elderly in the United States.8
Every now and then, a leap rather than an increment occurs, such as
with Medicare. The elderly and their families were impoverishing themselves
for medical care, and it was a longstanding problem that led them to lobby
Congress for a nationally uniform program.9 When Medicare was passed, it
was not a new idea; 0 rather, it was an idea whose time had come because a
political taste for it arose, and Medicare remains the only true social
insurance health care program in the United States (everyone aged sixty-five
and over, and those who become permanently disabled," enroll in
Medicare).12 Medicaid was the caboose to Medicare's train. But it, too,
showed the same federal recognition that the states could not afford to pay
for the needs of the poor and that some of the states did not want to pay as a
policy matter.
My argument, in terms of the patterns briefly described here, is that
federal intervention in health care in the United States tends to be incremental
rather than a takeover. Part of this incrementalism is the federal desire to
execute health care reforms with attention to the work that states have
historically performed in the field. National legislation tends to assume that
states should be in the health care game. But also, the debate as to what the
5 Nicole Huberfeld, The Universality of Medicaid at Fifty, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS
67, 87 (2015).
6 69 Years Ago, a President Pitches His Idea for National Health Care, PBS NEWs HOUR (Nov.
19, 2014), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/november-19-1945-harry-truman-calls-national-
health-insurance-program.
Sidney D. Watson, From Almshouses to Nursing Homes and Community Care: Lessons from
Medicaid's History, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 937, 947 (2010).
THEODORE R. MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE 11-15 (2d ed. 2000).
Ezekiel Emanuel, Symposium Keynote Speech, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 27, 30
(2015).
10 See MARMOR, supra note 8, at 4-11.
Social Security Act § 223(e), 42 U.S.C. § 423(e) (2018).
12 Robert M. Ball, Social Security Amendments of 1972: Summary and Legislative History, SOC.
SEC. BULLETIN (Mar. 1973), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v36n3/v36n3p3.pdf.
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role of the federal government should be has been basically the same debate
since the Supreme Court acknowledged Congress's constitutional authority
to regulate insurance in 1944.13 It is not a question of whether Congress has
authority to regulate health care, but how it will exercise that power.
One more historical example: A law called the Kerr-Mills Act was
passed in 1960,14 which offered block grants to states to pay for the poor and
the elderly's medical care. 5 If we were to take a map of the states that
participated in Kerr-Mills and transpose it onto a map of the states that were
first interested in participating in the Affordable Care Act, it would be
startlingly similar. Historical patterns indicate that wealthier states tend to be
on the forefront of health care reform and that poorer states tend to lag behind
for a variety of reasons, including budgeting or other economic reasons,
class-bias reasons, and race-based reasons.16 These historical patterns - of
incrementalism, of including states in reform, and of wealthy states being
more participatory - help us to understand why the ACA was more of a leap
forward than the usual incremental reform.
To understand this leap, we need to recall that when President
Obama was elected, almost 20% of the population was uninsured," and there
were known population gaps in insurance coverage. The United States has
long relied on employer-sponsored health insurance for gaining health care
coverage. Without health insurance, consistent access to medical care is
difficult for most people to obtain. So, the focus has been, over time, making
sure that everybody has health insurance coverage to facilitate consistent
access to health care.
By the time of the 2008 presidential election, a couple of trends
crystalized due to an all-time high of uninsurance. First, employers
decreasingly provided health insurance, from a high of about 72% around
1980" to about 52% of Americans being covered by employer-sponsored
health insurance in 2008.19 These nation-wide percentages are just the
starting place, as research shows that the less money a person earns, the less
likely her employer is to offer health insurance as an employment benefit. A
13 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
14 Social Security Amendments of 1960 (Kerr-Mills Act), Pub. L. 86-778, 74 Stat. 924 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C and 42 U.S.C.).
15 Judith D. Moore & David G. Smith, Legislating Medicaid: Considering Medicaid and Its
Origins, 27 HEALTH CARE FIN. REv. 45, 45-52 (2005).16 See LAURA KATZ OLSON, THE POLITICS OF MEDICAID 13, 27 (2010).
17 Jenna Levy, In U.S., Uninsured Rate Lowest Since 2008, GALLUP NEWS (Apr. 7, 2014),
http://news.gallup.com/poll/168248/uninsured-rate-lowest-2008.aspx (15.4% in Q3 of 2008).
1" Katharine R. Levit and Gary L. Olin, Americans'Health Insurance Coverage, 1980-91, 14
HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 31, 31-57 (1992).
" Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator (last visited Oct. 1, 2017).
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key demarcation was found to be 400% of the federal poverty level (FPL),
because studies show that the steps from 400% to 300% to 200% to 100% of
the FPL present significant decreases in the number and percentage of
individuals being offered health insurance as an employment benefit or being
offered health insurance that is affordable for low income workers. 20 For part-
time workers, the chances of being offered health insurance as an
employment benefit have been notably smaller and decreasing over time.
In short, a health insurance coverage crisis existed, especially for
people earning less than the average income for all Americans - about
$50,000. So, the political focus was to cover people who could not buy health
insurance coverage on their own or obtain it through work, which explains
why the ACA's greatest regulatory efforts were targeted to assisting lower
income populations. More stable coverage existed in Medicare and in
employer-sponsored insurance for the elderly and middle and upper income
populations, and the ACA made only small changes to these layers of the
health insurance coverage pyramid.21
Most of the ACA's regulatory work is in Medicaid and in private
individual or small group insurance because, historically, Medicaid has
covered only the deserving poor, which in combination with weak employer
sponsored coverage, left many low income Americans with no ability to gain
health insurance. Focus on the deserving poor was an Elizabethan notion, an
idea that no one receives assistance from the government unless they are
deemed worthy of it. Historically, this has meant that Medicaid covered only
people who were "poor plus": poor plus pregnant; poor plus disabled; poor
plus a child; poor plus elderly, and so on.22 The ACA changed that standard
by creating a new baseline, allowing non-elderly adults earning up to 133%
of the FPL to enroll in Medicaid, regardless of the status of being
"deserving." 23 This new baseline is important, because Medicaid was already
partially federalized, meaning it is a federal program that invites the states to
participate in nationally-established baselines with options for states to do
20 Trends in Employer-Sponsored Offer and Coverage Rates, KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
https://www.kff.org/private-insurance/issue-brief/trends-in-employer-sponsored-insurance-offer-
and-coverage-rates-1999-2014 (last visited Sept. 29, 2017).
21 Questions and Answers on Employer Shared Responsibility Provisions Under the Affordable
Care Act, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, https://www.irs.gov/affordable-care-
actlemployers/questions-and-answers-on-employer-shared-responsibility-provisions-under-the-
affordable-care-act (last visited Sept. 29, 2017) (Statistically, this only affected about 4% of all
employers); see also John Greenberg, Van Hollen says employer mandates affects 5% of
businesses, POLITIFACT (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/statements/2013/sep/18/chris-van-hollen/van-hollen-says-employer-mandate-affects-5-
busines.
22 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i) (2018) (identifying categories of people who are eligible for
Medicaid enrollment, such as the blind, disabled, pregnant, elderly, and children).
23 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (2018).
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more. 24 Under the ACA, a new aspect of Medicaid became nationalized --
the eligibility of nearly half of the nation's poor who had been excluded from
coverage until the ACA.
The ACA also focused on middle and low-income populations
through regulation of private insurance markets. Prior attempts to regulate
private insurance markets occurred before - for example, the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). 5 Many think of
HIPAA as a privacy law, but it also assisted people who experienced job-
lock to move from one workplace to the next without losing coverage, and
they wouldn't be penalized for having preexisting conditions.26 Until the
private insurance market reforms of the ACA, these markets were so
expensive that almost no one could afford individual or small group
insurance. The ACA offered tax credits to people earning 100% to 400% of
the FPL on a sliding scale to purchase health insurance through an exchange,
which is basically a clearinghouse where consumers can purchase health
insurance that meets ACA standards. In addition, the ACA makes everyone
insurable by preventing pre-existing exclusions, requiring community rating,
and regulating similar exclusionary practices by private insurers.
The ACA as drafted made Medicaid eligibility a national standard,
envisioned as a federal baseline with an invitation to states to participate
through accepting full federal funding for the newly-eligible population, and
to cover more people, but not fewer. The exchanges, on the other hand, were
designed to be state-run with a federal backup if states did not create their
own. 27 Massachusetts provided the model for the exchanges, and Congress
appeared to assume that other states would want to follow its lead.28 But, the
federalism of the ACA as drafted will remain untested due to NFIB v.
Sebelius; we cannot determine with any certainty whether the ACA's original
architecture would have worked as a model of "cooperative" federalism or
whether it would have been a good model of health care reform.
NFIB was one of the most complex and most watched cases in recent
Supreme Court history, and it involved three major statutory questions
(challenges to the "individual mandate" to purchase insurance, the Medicaid
expansion, and the ACA's severability) and five constitutional issues
24 Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431 (2011).
25 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat.
1936 (2018).
26 See 29 U.S.C. § 1181(a).
27 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1311(b)(1), 124 Stat.
119, 173 (2010).
28 See Elizabeth A. Weeks, Failure to Connect: The Massachusetts Plan for Individual Health
Insurance, 55 U. KAN. L. REv. 1283, 1283, 1290-91 (2007) (describing health care reform in
Massachusetts, including the "Connector" - Massachusetts' health insurance exchange).
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regarding congressional authority (the commerce, tax, spending, and
necessary and proper powers, and the Tenth Amendment). Arguably, NFIB
continued the Rehnquist federalism revolution, as the Rehnquist Court had
pursued judicial enforcement of the line between states and the national
government. In so doing, the Rehnquist Court articulated a concept of
federalism rooted in old ideas about what the role of the states is or should
be, a theory that the states needed to be protected from the federal
government. Yet, this dual sovereignty federalism, which our research
shows does not have real meaning in the modern era, contributed to the
muddled constitutional and policy outcomes in NFIB.
The Court espoused three novel constitutional theories in NFIB v.
Sebelius. First, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that Congress cannot regulate
"inactivity" by forcing individuals to be "active" in commerce by purchasing
health insurance,2 a 11w distinction in commerce power doctrine. Second,
the Court held that the Necessary and Proper Clause cannot be exercised
when the Court has decided that other constitutional authority is not being
used appropriately.30 In other words, though it may have been "necessary"
for Congress to regulate health insurance, it was not "proper" because
Congress could not exercise its commerce power to require individuals to
purchase insurance. (But then, the Court held that a tax penalty for failure to
buy health insurance can penalize that choice not to buy health insurance
through taxes - upholding Congress's power to enact the individual
mandate).31
Third, a plurality of the Court decided that the Medicaid expansion
is "new" Medicaid, that it is too different to be part of the old 1965 program
and that state funding could not be jeopardized if states desired not to
participate in the ACA's Medicaid expansion.32 The Court held that it is
unconstitutionally coercive for the federal government to withhold all of a
state's Medicaid funding, and in so doing recognized a newly enforceable
doctrine of coercion.33 This wasn't surprising, because Justice Kennedy for
years had been asking why the Court was not deploying the Tenth
Amendment to limit the spending power in the way that it limited the
commerce power.34 Yet, the Court left this novel theory unformed. Rather
29 Sebelius, at 559.
30 id.
31 I.R.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 2011) (The individual mandate's penalty was revoked on
December 22, 2017; see Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-07, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017)).
32 Sebelius, at 633.
33 Id. at 582-587.
34 Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 224 (2011).
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than articulate a rule for what coercion is, the Court said, essentially: "we'll
know it when we see it."35
Trying to parse coercion is tricky. Under the ACA, Congress
decided to pay fully for a new health care policy that few states considered
before the ACA. The Court seemed to decide that the Medicaid expansion
was not related enough to what came before ("old Medicaid"), but the
opinion did not overtly acknowledge a germaneness issue for the condition
on Medicaid spending.36 Also, the Court indicated that the amount of money
Congress offers is not consequential, rather it matters how much is threatened
to be taken away. But consider a simplified version of this assertion: if
Congress offered Minnesota ten dollars and then said "we're going to take it
all away if you don't fix every pothole in each of your roads," Minnesota
would say "okay," because only ten dollars is at stake. It must matter how
much Congress is offering states, not just how much or what percentage
could be taken away. Also strange is that the Court protected the states in the
vein of old-fashioned dual sovereignty federalism without naming the Tenth
Amendment.
Ultimately, despite finding Medicaid expansion to be
unconstitutionally coercive, the Court decided not to strike down any part of
the Medicaid Act or the ACA, and instead it limited the power of the
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to
penalize a state that chooses not to participate in the Medicaid expansion.37
Empowering states to make that choice in either direction (opt in or opt out)
was deeply federalism-centric. Yet, paradoxically, even though the Court
rendered a mandatory feature of Medicaid optional, the statute remains the
basis for an ongoing implementation relationship between the federal
government and states, but with a new set of extra-statutory parameters.38
The federalism of the NFIB decision is messy. It turned Medicaid
expansion on its head, giving leverage to the states so that they could
negotiate with the federal government in deciding whether to expand
eligibility. Medicaid expansion was nationally-oriented as written in the
ACA, but after NFIB, expansion became more state-oriented. The enabling
statute still contains the national goal of universality, but the tools for
35 That view did not work for the First Amendment, see Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 198
(1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
36 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
37 Nicole Huberfeld, Kevin Outterson & Elizabeth Weeks, Plunging into Endless Difficulties:
Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L.
REV. 1, 6 (2013).
38 Sebelius, at 585-589 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2006)).
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enforcing universal coverage were partially removed.3 9 And, states were
empowered to negotiate harder. Notably, section 1115 demonstration
waivers, a tool states have been using to negotiate Medicaid expansion,
already existed before NFIB.40 Nothing is different in the statutory law; what
is different is NFIB, a difference that also spilled over into the
implementation of exchanges. States used the leverage that they gained with
Medicaid to decide not to engage with the state-based exchanges in the ACA.
Instead, they have exercised power for its own sake by not participating in
the exchanges. As a result, the federal government had to do much more work
in creating exchanges than it ever intended to do, but simultaneously the
federally-run exchange states have drawn national power into their borders.
As of June 2012, many states were holding out as to whether they
were going to participate in implementing the ACA, because they wanted to
see what would happen in NFIB v. Sebelius. The reporting in the wake of the
decision was dissatisfying, because, at least at the national level, it sounded
like state participation was a simple in/out binary. While it is true that if a
state doesn't participate in Medicaid expansion, no expansion of eligibility
occurs in the state and millions of people have no health insurance, the in/out
binary is not true from the perspective of dynamic federalism. States have
been engaged in highly effective, ongoing negotiations with the federal
government to figure out how they could expand, when they could expand,
and what they could get for expanding.
In studying this set of negotiating dynamics beneath the surface, my
co-authors and I found that the ACA's implementation is much more
complex than any two-color map shows.4 1 We have seen that noticeable
triggers prompted state decisions to participate in ACA implementation.
Take Medicaid as an example. First, some states signed on to Medicaid
expansion very early -- Minnesota was one of them42 -- states that had already
been participating in Medicaid in a robust way, maximizing federal dollars
to expand coverage to everybody that they could. Second, NFIB was decided,
followed closely by HHS guidance indicating states could opt in or out at any
time, and some governors decided to take that federal money that was sitting
on the table. Third was the Arkansas section 1115 waiver - the first Medicaid
expansion waiver to permit a state to use federal Medicaid funding to place
the newly eligible Medicaid population into private insurance in the
3 See generally Nicole Huberfeld & Jessica L. Roberts, Medicaid Expansion as Completion of the
Great Society, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. SLIP OP. 1 (2014) (analyzing the concept of universality as a
civil right for Medicaid beneficiaries).
40 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2016).
41 See Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 3.
42 How Will the Uninsured in Minnesota Fair Under the Affordable Care Act?, KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., https://www.kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/state-profiles-uninsured-under-aca-
minnesota/ (last visited Oct 8 2017).
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exchange.4 3 When other states saw successful negotiations with HHS, they
wanted to get the rewards that came before plus a little more. After Arkansas,
Iowa, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and New Hampshire44 quickly followed, and
they all sought additional concessions from HHS. Fourth, once the ACA
became effective as of January 1, 2014, that appeared as if it would be the
final deciding moment; except that, again, NFIB turned everything on its
head. At that point, less than half of the states had opted into Medicaid
expansion, and yet HHS still had the national goal of universal coverage to
pursue.45 So, negotiations continued. Fast forward to 2016, when Indiana's
Medicaid waiver was approved and was the most complex and punishing of
the Medicaid expansion waivers. It contains features that were not permitted
in Medicaid, such as lock-out for failure to pay premiums; arguably, this new
flexibility was because of NFIB.
This is the health policy work NFIB is doing after five years: it has
been disruptive to the principle of universal coverage that was the goal of the
ACA (except for undocumented immigrants).46 NFIB disrupted universal
coverage and allowed variability where none was meant to exist. The
implementation of the ACA has been, and continues to be, much more
complicated than it was intended to be. That more dynamic implementation
is more complex than who is participating and who is not, because the states
are actively learning from one another to figure out what they can get in a
Medicaid waiver, and what concessions they can obtain from HHS. After
this talk goes to press, the states will still be trying to figure out what they
can negotiate. States have learned they can require "premium assistance"
(Arkansas style enrollment) ;47 enforceable premiums (a Medicaid enrollee
who cannot pay can be dropped); prevent payment for non-emergency
transportation; implement wellness initiatives ;48 and institute health savings
accounts. What no administration permitted, including the Obama
administration, was work requirements.49 Consistently, HHS denied requests
for work requirements because providing medical assistance to the poorso is
43 Sara Rosenbaum & Benjamin D. Sommers, Using Medicaid to Buy Private Health Insurance -
The Great New Experiment?, 369 NEw ENG. J. MED. 7, 8 (2013).
44 ROGER A. SEVIGNY, N.H. INS. DEP'T, N.H. BULL. No. 15-013-AB (2015).
45 Nicole Huberfeld & Jessica L. Roberts, Health Care and the Myth of Self-Reliance, 57 B.C. L.
REV. 1, 14 (2016).
46 Huberfeld, supra note 5, at 2.
47 42 U.S.C. § 1396e-1 (2014).
48 Huberfeld, supra note 31, at 81.
49See Drew Altman, Behind the Split Over Linking Medicaid Coverage
to Work Requirements, WALL ST. J.: WASHINGTON WIRE (May 11, 2015, 9:55
AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/05/1 1/behind-the-split-over-linking-medicaid-
coverage-to-work-requirements (last visited Mar. 28, 2018).
5 0 d.
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the stated purpose of the Medicaid Act.51 This is changing under the Trump
Administration, which I will discuss more in a moment.
In negotiations with each state, HHS has been pragmatic, prioritizing
insurance coverage as a long-term goal and respecting individual states'
preferences for participation in the ACA. The example of the exchanges
further highlights that this is not a binary, in/out set of decisions, either a
federally-based marketplace or a state-based marketplace. On the surface, it
could appear that "blue" is the state run exchanges and "red" is the federally
run exchanges, because blue states would have wanted to implement the
ACA and so would have created their own exchanges. But a state like
Oregon created its own exchange, which failed, and Oregon had to rely on
the federal exchange. Oregon suddenly went from "blue" to "red" because it
lost its state exchange, but that is clearly too simplistic, and it highlights the
oversimplification of the health care federalism present in implementation of
the ACA. Some states are shifting back and forth, some have created
hybrids. 52 That is pragmatic and dynamic federalism, not formalistic
constitutional federalism. The negotiations and movement happening are so
different from what the Court discussed in the context of federalism in NFIB,
it's astounding. The states are not only learning from one another and using
each other's model, they are effectively negotiating for themselves without
judicial intervention.53
Although NFIB thwarted the federalism design of the ACA, it has
also opened the door to perceiving a modern health care federalism that is
highly dynamic, negotiable, pragmatic, and horizontal (states are learning
from one another). We also can see that the states are operating as republics.54
A governor might agree with the President more than with his own
legislature. The commissioner of Medicaid in a given state may identify more
with the goals of HHS than with other state actors. Political alignments are
important to some degree, but they are not everything. And each state is
setting its own goals, contrary to judicial depictions of "the states" versus
"the federal government."
5 Nicole Huberfeld, Can Work Be Required in Medicaid?, 378 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 788 (2017).
52 State Decisions on Health Insurance Marketplaces and the Medicaid Expansion, KAISER
FAMILY FOUND., http://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-decisions-for-creating-
health-insurance-exchanges-and-expanding-
medicaid/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22cold%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:
%22asc%22%7D (last visisted Mar. 28, 2018).
53See Jenna Johnson, Maryland looks to Connecticut for health exchange answers, WASH. POST,
May 31, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/maryland-looks-to-
connecticut-for-health-exchange-answers/2014/05/31/481a7b9c-db83-1 1e3-8009-
7 1de85b9c527_story.html?utmterm=.42e528fa0d65.
54See Emily Le Coz, Two states, different experiences under health care law, USA TODAY, Dec.
1, 2013, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/12/01/health-exchange-
prices/3797039/.
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There is a disconnect between the Court's concept of federalism and
what has actually been happening in the health care reform context. And, the
question of how and whether formalistic federalism serves policy ends
remains important. Should a person who has a heart attack in Arizona be
treated differently than if she had a heart attack in New Mexico? They need
the same medical care; what would the value be of state variation,
sovereignty, or cooperation for a patient who needs life-saving medical
attention?
To that end, keep an eye on test cases for the new administration such
as Kentucky, which could be the first state to opt out of Medicaid expansion
after opting in and offered the first waiver application for the Trump
Administration to evaluate. President Trump's first Secretary of HHS, who
engaged with Kentucky over work requirements and other new waiver
elements, seems to think that health insurance should not exist5 and everyone
should pay cash for medical care. Similarly, but not as extreme, in meetings
where Indiana was negotiating a waiver for expansion with HHS, then-
consultant Seema Verma repeatedly used the phrase "personal
responsibility" in explaining the reasoning behind her design for Indiana's
waiver application. This catch-phrase for the current Administrator of the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) indicates that the agency
responsible for one of the largest budgets in the federal government and for
the health care of nearly one hundred million people is hostile to the ACA
and to Congress's decision to eradicate the notion of the "deserving poor."
In short, HHS is now led by administrators who have a different take on the
ACA than what the law was intended to do. Further to this point, President
Trump issued an executive order on the first day in office that was largely
intended to be deregulatory when it comes to health insurance, whether it is
private or public.57 HHS was told to give flexibility to the states and to
support a "free and open market." It is predictable, whatever happens with
legislative efforts to repeal and replace the ACA, that more section 1115
demonstration waivers will be granted in Medicaid for states that want to
expand, and likely with work requirements and other new features being
approved.s
The new administration's flexibility toward states may inspire new
states to opt into the Medicaid expansion because the implementation of the
5 5See Robert Pear, Tom Price, Obamacare Critic, Is Trump's Choice for Health Secretary, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 28, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/28/us/politics/tom-price-secretary-
health-and-human-services.html.
56 See generally. Empowering Patients First Act, H.R. 2300, 113th Cong. (2014).
5 Exec. Order No. 13,765, 82 Fed. Reg. 8351 (Jan. 24, 2017).
58 CMS approved Kentucky and Indiana waivers that include work requirements as this transcript
goes to press. See Huberfeld, supra note 51.
